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Abstract. The purpose of the study was to determine the level of knowledge and attitudes towards 
surveillance capitalism and online institutional privacy protection practices among adolescents in Poland 
(aged 18–19), as well as to determine the relationships between these variables. Surveillance capitalism 
has emerged as a result of internet users’ activities and involves the collection of all data about these 
users by different entities for speciic beneits without letting them know about it. The dominant role 
in surveillance capitalism is played by hi-tech corporations. The aim of the study was to verify whether 
knowledge, and what kind of knowledge, on surveillance capitalism translates into practices related to 
the protection of online institutional privacy. The study was conducted on a sample of 177 adolescents in 
Poland. The main part of the questionnaire consisted of two scales: the scale of knowledge and attitudes 
on surveillance capitalism, and the scale of online institutional privacy protection practices. The results 
of the study, calculated by statistical methods, showed that although the majority of respondents had 
average knowledge and attitudes about surveillance capitalism, which may result from insuficient 
knowledge of the subject matter, this participation in specialized activities/workshops inluences the 
level of intensiication of online institutional privacy protection practices.
Keywords: institutional privacy, surveillance capitalism, Polish adolescents, online privacy protection 
practices
Introduction 
In the digital era, digital data is a valuable resource. Companies collect, store, 
analyze and commodify it, oten without the approval of those from which the data 
is collected. he phenomenon is known as "traceability" (Latour 2007) and indicate 
that each of our online moves is tracked and enters a database to be analyzed in the 





future. Traceability is now an inseparable element of digital culture and our partici-
pation in it. Many researchers dealing with data (Clark 2006; Ashworth, Free 2006; 
Degli Esposti 2014; van Dijck 2014) underline that commercial data collection is 
a new form of surveillance deined as dataveillance (van Dijck 2014) or surveillance 
capitalism (Zubof 2015, 2019). he researchers observed that digital data can be 
analyzed by algorithms for commercial or political outcomes to foresee successfully 
sexual orientation (Jernigan, Mistree 2009), gender, ethnic origin, political views, and 
religion (Kosinski, Stillwell, Graepel 2013), and also for a political proiling (Nadler, 
Crain, Donovan, 2018).
Many privacy researchers focus on the sharing of personal information (e.g. 
gender, age, address, personal photos etc.) and the self-disclosure of the same on 
social media sites (Barnes 2006; boyd, Hargittai 2010; Debatin et al. 2009; boyd 
2014; Taddicken 2014; Culver, Grizzle 2017). hey concentrate on social privacy in 
networked public spaces, especially in relation to other users (e.g. parents, classmates, 
unknowns). But there are few researches concerned with privacy in the context of 
collecting and analyzing digital data, especially for selling it or predicting users’ 
private traits or preferences (Turow, Feldman, Meltzer 2005; Raynes-Goldie 2010; 
Young, Quan-Haase 2013; Lutz, Ranzini 2017), what is called instutitional privacy 
(Raynes-Goldie 2010).
In this context, it is interesting to determine how many modern teenagers actu-
ally prefer to have access to content and digital products that protect their private 
data against surveillance capitalism practices, what knowledge they possess about 
the functioning of hidden algorithmic mechanisms violating their private sphere 
without their approval, and what protective strategies they have undertaken against 
surveillance capitalism. he purpose of the study was to determine the knowledge 
and attitudes on surveillance capitalism possessed by youths in Poland aged of 18–19 
years, and whether this relates to online privacy protection practices. For many years, 
Internet users in Poland have been at the international forefront when it comes to 
use online applications for blocking online advertising (Newman et al. 2017, p. 26, 
Digital in 2018, p. 47). hey are also characterized by a very low level of digital 
optimism, or the belief that new technologies ofer more opportunities then risks. 
In 2018, in the Digital study, they occupied third place (41%) just behind Belgians 
(38%) and Germans (37%). In connection with the above, one might assume that 
they have high knowledge about diferent surveillance and online protection privacy 
practices.
An online questionnaire was created to investigate how adolescents in Poland 
relate to knowledge and attitudes on surveillance capitalism (KASC), and whether 
they undertake online institutional privacy protection strategies (IPPP). 
he main research questions involved determining what young people in Poland 
know about the indications of surveillance capitalism, what attitudes they reveal about 
this, and what protective practices they prefer to protect against institutional privacy? 
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Surveillance capitalism in the age of Big Data
Modern technological infrastructure, from cookies through devices, online and 
mobile services to search engines and platforms, were designed to generate digital 
data that can be read algorithmically (Urichio 2011). As a consequence, the availability 
of a large amount of digital data combined with the improved computational tech-
nology of their processing (data mining), largely derived from research on artiicial 
intelligence, has enabled the efective dataication of social, cultural and political life 
on a wide scale and started a socio-cultural phenomenon called Big Data. hanks to 
various applications installed in smartphones, companies know how long we sleep, 
what activities we undertake during the day, how much time we devote to commuting 
to work, school and home, what we like, how we spend our free time, what interests 
we have, etc. Big Data provides a lot of diferent kinds of data that can be combined, 
compared and correlated in any way. At the same time this is both a signiicant value 
and weakness of Big Data. Since the majority of our professional and private activities 
are carried out using various digital devices, Big Data covers a broad range of our 
everyday activities. he more frequently we use digital devices, the more identiiable 
we become.
As Shoshana Zubof notes, Big Data is now the basis of a new logic of capital 
accumulation, which she calls "surveillance capitalism". Surveillance capitalism “de-
termines what is measured, and what is passed over; how resources and people are 
allocated and organized; who is valued in what roles; what activities are undertaken 
– and for what purpose. he logic of accumulation produces its own social relations 
and with that its conceptions and uses of authority and power” (Zubof 2015, p. 77). 
Surveillance capitalism is a "new form of information capitalism [that] aims to predict 
and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market control" 
(Zubof 2015, p. 75). As Zubof notes, surveillance capitalists quickly realized that the 
most valuable data is generated when consumers are pushed or forced into speciic 
behaviors that bring proit to companies and therefore their automated machine pro-
cesses not only follow our behavior but also shape it (Zubof 2019, p. 18).
In case of surveillance capitalism, digital data is collected to not speciically deined 
goals that are unknown to a consumer (Lyon, Bauman 2013; van Dijck 2014, p. 205). 
As Debatin et al. notices what is visible (and what he is conscious) is only a small part 
(1/8) of the activities and network interactions. he whole rest (7/8) makes the sphere 
invisible, hidden, which consists of "data that trickle down from the interactions and 
self-descriptions of the users in the visible part. To maintain the separation (and the 
user’s motivation to provide and constantly update his or her personal data), any mar-
keting and advertising based on these data must be unobtrusive and subcutaneous" 
(Debatin et al. 2009, p. 88). he value of the data is not deined by their acquisition 
itself, but by the potential use in the future and the possibility of their unlimited 
use (Mayer-Schonberger, Cukier 2013). Moreover, data monitoring far exceeds any 





watching of individuals, because it penetrates deeply into social issues (Andrejevic 
2012, p. 86) in order to predict complex phenomena such as consumers' decisions 
(Nissenbaum 2010, pp. 42–44; Citron, Pasquale 2014). 
Surveillance capitalism is part of the struggles of new media corporations look-
ing to achieve hegemony in the communication networks, and is a basic business 
model of not only such technology giants as Google or Facebook, but also of various 
start-ups ofering services and online applications. his hegemony is based on the 
asymmetry of relationship and information (Ramesh, Fish 2017; Nissenbaum 2010; 
Halavais 2009; Andrejevic 2014). Mark Andrejevic (2014) calls this asymmetry of 
the relation between those who collect, store and exploit large amounts of data, and 
those from whom this data is sourced, the big data divide. Each of these two groups 
has diferent options on the access and use of the data, which also determines the 
asymmetry of the relation (e.g. social sorters versus social "sortees", and forecasters 
versus those subordinating to the forecast). Moreover, Andrejevic notes that "the big 
data paradigm challenges the empowering promise of the Internet by proposing the 
superiority of post-explanatory pragmatics (available only to the few) to the forms 
of comprehension that digital media were supposed to make more accessible to the 
many" (Andrejevic 2014, p. 1675). danah boyd and Kate Crawford (2011) speak in 
a similar way, and in their opinion the present Big Data ecosystem creates a new kind 
of digital divide between the Big Data rich and the Big Data poor (boyd, Crawford 
2011). In addition, David Lyon raises: "the overall efects of consumer surveillance, 
especially through all kinds of internet use, are not only to cream of those content-
ed consumers and promise further rewards and beneits, but also to cut of those 
who do not conform to expectations" (Lyon, Bauman 2013, p. 104–105). A new 
form of digital exclusion is revealed based on the interests of those technological 
corporations which ofer their services and products "for free". Users are aware of 
it, so they partly relinquish their privacy and agree to various forms of surveil-
lance of their data, which simultaneously separates them from the threat of digital 
exclusion.
he asymmetry of information relies on controlling: 
•	 all	information	about	the	user’s	activities	on	the	Internet,	social	networking	
sites or mobile devices,
•	 information	about	the	purposes	and	means	of	collecting,	storing,	analyzing	and	
using the data and information that are collected about users,
•	 available	information,	making	its	selection	dependent	on	intelligent	algorithms	
analyzing user behaviors and preferences.
Surveillance capitalism should also be seen as a new form of "data colonialism" 
normalizing the exploitation of human beings through data and "paving the way for 
a new stage of capitalism whose outlines we only glimpse: the capitalization of life 
without limit" (Couldry, Mejias 2018). In a situation where our behavior as consumers 
of the digital products and services ofered by digital companies becomes what drives 
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surveillance capitalism and provides proits only to these companies (Zubof 2019, 
p. 11), this phenomenon should be carefully analyzed in the context of institutional 
privacy and the protection practices against it.
Privacy in surveillance capitalism
In recent years, privacy in the digital era and in surveillance capitalism has been 
one of the most important issues. Surveillance of a user’s online activity is very com-
monly identiied as a restriction or interference with the right to privacy (UNESCO 
2015). Privacy is important not only because it is an inalienable human right to protect 
one's identity, but also because it is a part of the structure of social life (Blank, Bolsover, 
Dubois 2014, p. 4). According to Nissenbaum: „Activities online, mediated by the Net, 
are deeply integrated into social life: they may be continuous with brick-and-mortar 
correlates or, at the very least, have the power to afect communications, transactions, 
interactions, and activities in those realms (and vice versa)” (Nissenbaum 2011, p. 38). 
Academics in previous studies focused more on social privacy protection practices 
(controlling access to personal information on social media platforms for the other 
users) rather than institutional privacy protection practices (controlling how digital 
companies and their partners might use personal and digital data) (Raynes-Goldie 
2010). Many researchers have noted that users are concerned about their privacy on the 
web, but they are practically unable to take any action to protect it. his variance between 
attitudes and behavior was deined as the “privacy paradox” (Barnes 2006; Acquisti, 
Gross 2006; Taddicken 2014). Blank, Bolsover, and Dubois (2014, p. 15–16), however, 
point out that this was indeed oten the case at the beginning of SNS development, but 
now young users aged 14–24 are not apathetic toward online privacy. In turn, Taddicken 
(2014, p. 266) shows that there is no signiicant relationship between online privacy 
concerns on self-disclosure behavior, wherein she did not distinguish between public 
self-disclosure and self-disclosure behavior with clearly deined communities where 
users feel safe from privacy invasion. However, Trepte et al. (2014) argues that dispar-
ities between attitudes and behaviors might not indicate paradoxical and inconsistent 
behavior, but address diferent dimensions of privacy. His research shows that attitudes 
are not easy to use as predictors of privacy behavior, because there is more inluence for 
this behavior due to negative online experiences and internet skills1. Similar conclusions 
follow from the research of Büchi et al. conducted among Swiss university students, 
where it was observed that "attitudes are not the primary explanation for users’ varying 
levels of privacy protection", but online privacy breaches and skills. Participants who 
have experienced privacy violation online will engage in more self-protective privacy 
1 he authors consider the problem only for informational, social, and psychological privacy. hey 
did not deal with institutional privacy.





behaviors (Büchi, Just, Latzer 2016, p. 16). It seems, however, that the situation in which 
there is a breach of privacy due to the action of a real person is more frequent and easier 
to observe than when users experience a breach of privacy due to the use of their data 
without their knowledge and approval, such as for sale to other entities or for proiling. 
Scandals such as that of Cambridge Analytica in 2018 occur extremely rarely, and, as 
demonstrated by the practice, did not translate into a massive outlow of Facebook users. 
What's more, proiling, and especially algorithmic personalization of content, can be 
perceived by users as beneicial, especially by those who do not have the motivation or 
the skills to personalize the content to their own preferences (Sundar, Marathe 2010). 
A factor that seems to play a signiicant role here involve the social beneits that users 
derive from disclosing information about themselves (Trepte et al. 2014, p. 8) which is 
rewarding for the user's brain (Tamir, Mitchell 2012).
Due to the debatable issue of the existence of the "privacy paradox" and the com-
plexity and multi-dimensionality of online privacy behaviors, alternative proposals 
by researchers explain the discrepancy between privacy attitudes and real behavior as 
"privacy cynicism" (Hofmann, Lutz, Ranzini 2016) or the "privacy dilemma" (Matzner 
et al. 2016). 
he distinction for social privacy and institutional privacy seems to be crucial to 
explain how users more likely to undertake protection practices against other users 
than against invisible and abstract web actors. According to the Eurobarometer e-Pri-
vacy survey carried out among the population of the European Union aged 15–24, 
only slightly negative attitudes to tracking online activities prevail. For example, only 
54% respondents think that their online activities monitored in exchange for unre-
stricted access to a certain website is not acceptable and 58% say that is unacceptable 
for companies to share information about them without their approval, even if it 
helps these companies to provide new services they might like. What is interesting is 
that a signiicant number of respondents allow such activities, with 45% stating that 
having their online activities monitored in exchange for unrestricted access to a cer-
tain website is acceptable, while 42% think that is acceptable for companies to share 
information about them without their approval, even if it helps these companies to 
provide new services they might like (European Union, DG COMM 2016, p. 57–59). 
From the research by Young and Quan-Haase, students who use Facebook showed 
little or no concern about threats from Facebook or third party data companies, but 
they were concerned about how other people may use personal data and information 
(Young, Quan-Haase 2013, p. 493–494). Users of Tinder were more concerned about 
institutional privacy then social privacy (Lutz, Ranzini 2017).
Importantly, online privacy researches indicate that there is a signiicant link be-
tween internet and digital skills (boyd, Hargittai 2010; Litt 2013), knowledge (Matzner 
et al 2016, pp. 282–285, Nissenbaum 2011, p. 45), and the intensity and the type of 
undertaken privacy practices. Some media scholars observe that the key to protecting 
our data is digital literacy. For example, Kennedy et al. believes that the 'conscious 
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user' of digital media education is becoming more and more important nowadays 
(Kennedy, Poell, van Dijck 2015), which means that awareness of how much users 
know about data streams and their abilities to control them is really important to 
manage privacy. his is conirmed by the studies (Büchi et al.) showing that internet 
skills are an important complementary predictor of self-protective privacy behavior 
(Büchi, Just, Latzer 2016, p. 15–16). As Matzner et al. concludes, protection of social 
privacy requires diferent practices and activities then institutional privacy (Matzner 
et al. 2016).
Methodology and hypotheses
he study tests two research hypotheses that concern two factors (attitude and 
skills), as discussed above, and how they inluence the privacy behaviors:
1. Users with extensive knowledge and a negative attitude towards surveillance 
capitalism undertake online institutional privacy protection practices (IPPP).
2. Users participating in classes or workshops on internet safety and privacy (ISP) 
are much more likely to undertake online institutional privacy protection prac-
tices (IPPP).
In order to study how young Poles refer to surveillance capitalism, and whether 
they undertake related online institutional privacy protection strategies, an online 
questionnaire was created. he study was conducted in the period December 2017 – 
March 2018 among high school students and technical schools students aged 18–19 
(N=177). Due to the selection of the sample, it was not representative.
he selection of the research group resulted from several factors. First of all, the 
18–19 year-olds belonged to groups that use the Internet (54% daily or almost daily) 
and social media (40% daily or almost daily) most actively. Secondly, the 18–19 year-
olds were in a formal stage of education.
he questionnaire consisted of 4 parts: 
1) A statistical part/speciications (e.g. questions about age, gender, type of school, 
participation or non-participation in workshops on internet safety/digital lit-
eracy);
2) 5 questions regarding the use of digital devices and applications;
3) 33 statements verifying knowledge and attitude towards surveillance capitalism 
(KASC), e.g. "he websites I use have the right to collect private information 
about me", "Internet search engines, e.g. Google, Bing, Yahoo! Baidu records and 
stores the search terms", "Facebook is able to predict my emotions", "Based on 
online activity, someone can predict sexual orientation", "On the basis of online 
activity, companies create consumer proiles to which they direct personalized 
advertising", "If it is possible to sell private digital data in the future, I will be 





happy to use it", "In the information society, data collected by technology com-
panies can only be used to improve the devices or applications we use";
4) 30 statements verifying online institutional privacy protection practices (IPPP), 
e.g. "In an information society, data collected by technology companies can only 
be used to improve the devices or applications we use", "When I do not use the 
navigation or map function, I disable geolocation on a mobile device or social 
networking site", "I share my data on social networks with the number of steps 
or kilometers traveled and heart rate levels", "I use various search engines to 
protect my digital identity", "By logging into new websites using social media 
accounts, I check what permissions the page requests".
In the case of conclusions verifying knowledge and attitude, the respondent had 
to indicate answers on a 5-point Likert scale from "strongly disagree" to "strongly 
agree". In the case of conclusions verifying practices, the respondent had to indicate 
answers on a 5-point Likert scale from "never" to "all the time".
Because the essence of surveillance capitalism is the collection and use of the users’ 
data by technological corporations in order to achieve their business goals, parts 3 
and 4 include in the questionnaire issues concerning: 
- Understanding how data is collected,
- Attitudes towards data collecting,
- Understanding the efects of surveillance capitalism,
- Application and privacy policy,
- Protecting against surveillance capitalism.
Participation by the respondents was voluntary and everyone consented to the 
processing of collected data for scientiic purposes. he questionnaire was published 
online and a link to it was sent out along with an invitation to participate in the sur-
vey to teachers, based on the snowball method (subsequent teachers were to invite 
the next ones).
he study adopted explanatory variables: (1) participation in classes or workshops 
on ISP (yes/no), and variables explained: (1) knowledge and attitude on surveillance 
capitalism (KASC)2, (2) online institutional privacy protection practices (IPPP)3 and 
co-occurring variables: (1) knowledge and attitude on surveillance capitalism, and 
(2) online institutional privacy protection strategies.
 In the statistical analysis of the obtained results, descriptive methods and methods 
of statistical inference were used. To characterize the average value for quantitative 
traits, the arithmetic average (M) was calculated, and the standard deviation (SD) was 
assumed to be the scattering pattern, while the quartile measure (Q1, Mdn, Q3) was 
2 he scale of knowledge and attitudes: totality of statements: 1–33 (including inversely scored 1, 4, 
9, 10, 11, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25) (∑=165 points).
3 he scale of practices: totality of statements 1–8, 12–19 (statement 17 is inversely scored) (∑= 80 
points).
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used to represent the position of the observation. he analysis of qualitative variables 
was performed by calculating the number and percentages of the occurrences of each 
value. he conformity of the distributions of quantitative traits with normal distribu-
tion was assessed using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (for N> 100) or Shapiro-Wilk 
(for N <100) and on the basis of analysis of skewness and kurtosis indices as well as 
standard errors, on the basis of a visual assessment of their histograms, and QQ charts. 
Due to the lack of conformity of variable distributions coexisting with the normal 
distribution to the study of compounds, Spearman's rank correlation was applied. To 
compare the distributions of quantitative variables in two groups, a Mann-Whitney 
U test was used (for variables with a non-normal distribution) or a Student's t-test 
for independent samples (for variables with near-normal distribution). he Levene 
test was used to determine the equality of variance in the samples. For all analyses, 
the maximum admissible type I error α = 0.05 was assumed, while p ≤ 0.05 was 
considered statistically signiicant. 
Results
A. Characteristics of the studied group
A total of 177 people, high schools students and users of digital media, took part 
in the survey. he majority of respondents were 18 year-olds, at around 60%, while 
the remaining 40% were 19-year olds. Among the respondents, 51% attended a high 
school, while 49% attended a technical school. Almost two-thirds of the respondents 
(62%) were men, while over a third (38%) were women. he largest group of respond-
ents involved people living in rural areas (38%).
 Among the digital devices that the respondents indicated as the most frequently 
used, smartphones appeared in irst place (100% of respondents), laptops in second 
place (70%), and desktop computers in third place (62%). Tablets (20%) were the 
least frequently used devices. 
In the case of a number of applications installed on a smartphone, 40% of respond-
ents indicated the "6–10" range for the application, while 15% indicated the range 
"11–15" and "above 20". Due to the fact that a tablet is not one of the popular devices 
used by the respondents, the most common indication for the number of applications 
installed on this device was the range "0–5" (20%). 
he surveyed group was diverse in terms of experience and participation in classes 
or workshops on internet safety and privacy (ISP) conducted outside school or at 
school by people unrelated to school. Among the respondents, 51% did not participate 
in classes/workshops ISP, while 49% conirmed their participation in such activities.
Since almost 50% of the respondents participated in classes or workshops on ISP, 
it should be assumed that their knowledge about surveillance capitalism is high. Of 





course, such an assumption has some limitations. Firstly because it is not known 
which issues were discussed during the classes/workshops, and secondly in what form 
they actually took place. hese two factors may have a signiicant impact on the way 
knowledge is acquired.
Knowledge and attitude on surveillance capitalism (KASC)
he lowest level of KASC of the respondents was 62 points, while the highest one 
was 154 points. A result on this scale in the range of 132–165 points means great 
knowledge and a negative attitude towards surveillance capitalism (Tab. 1).
Table 1. Characteristics of the level of the KASC in the studied sample (N = 177)
Variable n M SD Min Max Skew K K-S p
Knowledge and attitude on 
surveillance capitalism (KASC)
177 126,85 15,15 62 154 -0,98 2,14 0,09 0,002
Remark: n – number; M- average; SD- standard deviation; Min – lowest value; Max – highest 
value; Skew – skewness;
K – kurtosis; K-S – result of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; p – signiicance level for the K-S test.
In "knowledge and attitudes" scale only 0.56% of respondents (one person) ob-
tained a result showing very low knowledge and an extremely positive attitude toward 
surveillance capitalism, while about 40% of respondents (N = 71) obtained a score 
between 132–165 points, signifying a negative and deinitely negative attitude towards 
surveillance capitalism as well as a very large and extensive knowledge on this subject. 
he highest number of respondents, 59.32% (N = 105), gave a result between the 
extreme scale of values  (M=126.85, SD= 15.15).
he analysis of individual answers, however, yields interesting results. Although 
the vast majority of respondents fairly and fully agree that the internet should not be 
controlled either by governments (66.10%) or corporations (68.36%), a large num-
ber of them having no opinion on these issues (about governments – 17.51%, about 
corporations – 20.34%). he same applies to the online privacy at stake. But, almost 
50% respondents fairly and totally agree that data collected by tech companies can be 
used to improve the devices or application, and 30.51% have no opinion on this issue. 
A large group of respondents (41.78%) fairly and completely agree that the websites 
have a right to collect private information about them, but a similar group (38.42%) 
does not agree. A total of 25% likes the fact that websites suggest products that may 
be of interest. Some of them declared forgoing from online privacy in exchange for 
free access to digital content (16.38%), but the large group has no opinion on this issue 
(22.6%). However, the vast majority of respondents would not sell private digital data 
in the future (55.37%) or would not exchange it for cheaper or free services (54.24%). 
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Knowledge and attitudes towards tracking and collecting user data are much more 
diverse than one might think, given the fact, that most adolescents strongly agree, 
and agree that each online activity or on a mobile device leaves a permanent footprint 
(87.5% of respondents). 
When it comes to knowledge about the use of data by entities that collect and 
analyze them, that big group of adolescents strongly agree and agree, that companies 
collecting digital data can use programs to predict behaviors of online users (72%), 
but almost 21.5% adolescents neither agreed nor disagreed. he same number of sur-
vey participants strongly agreed, and agreed that mobile devices should collect data 
to determine the frequency, time, place and period of use by a user (72%), but 10% 
of adolescents had no opinion about this issue. 56% of the respondents thought that 
search engine results were complete and objective, although 25% neither agreed nor 
disagreed. In the case of knowledge by adolescents about the potential for using data 
for predicting personal trails or preferences, 38.41% strongly disagreed, and disagreed 
that Facebook was able to predict emotions, but a large group thought diferently 
(31.64%), while 29.94% neither agreed nor disagreed. Signiicantly difering points 
of view were presented by respondents in terms of predicting preferences based on 
online activity. Here, 76.84% of the respondents strongly agreed, and agreed that it 
was possible. Over half of the respondents also agreed that the following could be 
predicted based on digital data: conscientiousness and openness (53%), gender (67%), 
sexual orientation (67%), economic status (59%), and political preferences (70%). 
Still, a large number of respondents had no opinion about the possibility of predicting 
personal characteristics based on online activity, i.e. conscientiousness and openness 
(20%), gender (16%), sexual orientation (21%), economic status (25%), and political 
preferences (20%).
Due to the large number of responses indicating a lack of knowledge and opinions, 
people participating in extracurricular activities or workshops on online security and 
privacy conducted by non-school personnel were checked if they difered from those 
who did not participate in such classes, in terms of the level of knowledge and attitudes 
about the online collection of data. Table 2 shows the results obtained in the study.
he Mann-Whitney U test analysis did not show statistically signiicant diferences 
between the groups in the range of the tested variable: Z = 1.64, ni. his means that 
those who participated in extracurricular activities or workshops conducted by non-
school people on online safety and privacy did not difer from those who did not 
participate in such classes, in terms of level of knowledge and attitudes about online 
data collection. he lack of a clear diference between groups may result from the 
lack of the subject of data protection and practices related to their collection and use 
during classes about internet safety and privacy, which was not tested in the study. 
In summary, the knowledge and attitudes of users about surveillance capitalism are 
diverse. Although the vast majority of adolescents agrees with the statement that their 
online privacy is at risk and is aware of the fact that any online activity leaves footprints 





that can be used for diferent purposes, there is quite a large group of young people 
who do not have an opinion on such an important for their online privacy matters.
B. Online institutional privacy protection practices (IPPP)
he average level obtained by the respondents in the scope of IPPP was M=126.85 
points with a standard deviation SD=15.15 point. On the other hand, the lowest level 
of IPPP among the respondents was 20 points, while the highest was 69 points; the 
average level obtained by the respondents in the scope of data protection practices 
was M=41.66 points with a standard deviation SD=9.27 points. he result on this 
scale in the range of 64–80 points means high and very high level of online privacy 
protection strategies.
Table 3. Characteristics of the level of the IPPP in the studied sample (N = 177)
Variable N M SD Min Max Skew K K-S p
Online institutional privacy 
protection practices (IPPP)
177 41.66 9.27 20 69 -0.18 -0.28 0.08 0.005
Remark: N – number; M- average; SD- standard deviation; Min – lowest value; Max – highest 
value; Skew – skewness; K- kurtosis; K-S – result of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; p – signiicance level 
for the K-S test.
Table 2. he characteristic of knowledge and attitude level on surveillance capitalism among 
adolescents participating (n = 87) and non-participating (n = 90) in workshops about internet 




















Yes 87 95.41 8301 122 129 138 128.11 16.45 62 154
1.64 0.101
No 90 82.80 7452 117 127 135 125.63 13.75 92 151
Remark: n- number, r- – average weight, R – total weight, Q
1
 – 1st quantile, Mdn – median, Q
3
 – 3rd 
quantile, M – average, SD – standard deviation, Min – lowest value, Max – highest value, Z – result of 
Mann-Whitney U test, p – signiicance level of Z-test
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As for the results on the "practice" scale, only 0.56% of the respondents (one 
person) obtained a result indicating a high degree of information privacy protection 
practices, 19.77% (N=35) presented a very low or low level; however, as much as 
79.66% (N=141) obtained a result showing a moderate degree of privacy practices 
(between 33–64 points) (M=41.66, SD=9.27).
A signiicant number of respondents without a moderate level of intensiication 
of practices may result from a lack of knowledge about surveillance capitalism and 
competence in privacy management (Fig. 1), especially those purely technical, con-
nected for example with the ability to change application settings, as well as lack of 
tools for obfuscation activity (Fig. 2). In the part of literature review it was indicated 
that digital competences are an important complementary predictor of self-protective 
privacy behavior (Litt 2013; Büchi, Just, Latzer 2016, p. 15–16).
Although the vast majority of the adolescents turn of geolocalisation when they 
do not use it (47%), a large group of them still does not modify default setting ater 
installation (17.51%) and 18.64% seldom modiies it. A large group also does not verify 
(12.53%) or seldom veriies (22.6%) the author and the source before uploading it. 
Figure 1. Online information privacy protection practices: setting of device and application 
[%], N=177.
he respondents do not use or seldom use light obfuscation practices (Fig. 2). 
A large group of respondents does not use diferent browsers (41%) as well as does not 
install plug-ins against tracking, e.g. Ghostery (40.68%). here are still respondents 
who do not delete cookies browser (22.03%) or do it seldomly (25.99). Moreover, 
a large number of respondents do not use a private browser mode (22.6%) or do 
it rarely (23.16%). Besides, many users do not log in at all (22.03%) or do so rarely 
(28.25%) to new websites using a social media account ("linking accounts").





Figure 2. Online institutional privacy protection practices: light obfuscation [%], N=177.
To sum up, adolescents in terms of their privacy protection practices against the 
use of their data by institutions for various purposes are characterized by large di-
versity. While some practices are undertaken oten or almost all the time by almost 
half of the adolescents (e.g. turn of geolocalisation when not used, checking of SNS 
settings and non-connecting of SNS accounts), others – equally non-engaging and not 
requiring specialized skills – are not taken at all or are rarely taken by more than half 
of the respondents (e.g. private mode in browser, use of diferent browsers, installing 
plug-ins against tracking or deleting cookies in the browser). his shows that privacy 
practices that can easily protect users from surveillance capitalism are not taken.
C. Hypothesis 1 testing. Users with extensive knowledge and a negative attitude towards 
surveillance capitalism undertake IPPP.
In order to check the relationship between the level of knowledge and attitude on 
surveillance capitalism (KASC), and the level of online institutional privacy protection 
practices (IPPP), a rho-Spearman correlation analysis was carried out. Table 4 below 
shows the correlation coeicients from the analysis. 
Correlation analysis did not show any statistically signiicant relationship between 
the level of KASC and the level of IPPP: rs = 0.10, ni. his means that in the surveyed 
group, both people with high and low knowledge about surveillance capitalism apply 
similar practices in the scope of online privacy protection. he level of knowledge and 
the negative attitude do not afect the online privacy protection practices. herefore, 
hypothesis 1 was not conirmed.
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Table 4. Correlation and dependence between the level of knowledge and attitude on 
surveillance capitalism and the level of online privacy protection practices in the sample under 
review (N = 177)
Knowledge and attitude on surveillance capitalism (KASC)
rho-Spearman Signiicance level
Online privacy protection 
practices (OPPP)
0.10 0.193
D. Hypothesis 2 testing. Users participating in classes or workshops on internet safety and 
privacy (ISP) are much more likely to undertake online institutional privacy protection 
practices (IPPP)
In order to verify whether people participating in-school or out-of-school activities 
on ISP difered from those who did not participate in such classes, in terms of the 
level of IPPP, an analysis was carried out using Student's t-test for independent tests. 
Table 5 shows the results obtained in the study.
Table 5. Characteristics of the level of IPPP among participants (N=87) and non-participants 



















Yes 87 43.05 8.25 27 69 37.50 44 49
1.98 0.050
No 90 40.32 10.02 20 62 32 42 48
Remark : n – number; M – average; SD – standard deviation; Min – lowest value; Max – highest 
value; Q
1
 -irst quartile; Mdn – median; Q
3
 – third quartile; t – student’s t-test result for independent 
samples; p – signiicance level for the t test
he Student's t-test for independent samples showed statistically signiicant dif-
ferences between the groups in the range of the analyzed variable: t (170,72)=1.98; p 
<0.050; d=0.30 – this means that people participating in classes or workshops on ISP 
presented a higher level of IPPP than those who did not participate in such classes, 
so they used these practices more oten.






he purpose of the study was to determine the knowledge and attitudes on sur-
veillance capitalism of adolescents in Poland aged of 18–19, and with what frequency 
they undertake institutional privacy protection practices. he study showed that ad-
olescents present diverse knowledge and attitudes on surveillance capitalism as well 
as a various levels of online protection practices. However, the majority presented 
moderate knowledge and a lack of a clear attitude (59.32%), and a large group of ad-
olescents presented a moderate level of protection privacy practices (79.66%). Such 
a large number of moderate indications on both scales may result from the issue 
being too abstract, unrelated to their experience as Internet and mobile devices users. 
Also, the fact that the questions mostly concerned general issues and less frequently 
referred to speciic social media, could also afect a large percentage of such responses. 
he analyses did not show statistically signiicant relationships between the level 
of knowledge and attitudes of the respondents on surveillance capitalism and the 
level of their online institutional privacy practices. At this point, however, it should be 
noted that the majority of respondents (N=105) presented moderate knowledge and 
attitudes. he lack of a connection between knowledge and attitudes about surveil-
lance capitalism and the practices of privacy protection may be explained by factors 
that inluence the shaping of practices, as mentioned in the theoretical part. As the 
researchers point out, one of the most important factors afecting privacy practices 
is the negative experience of privacy violations (Trepte et al. 2014; Büchi, Just, Latzer 
2016). In this study, this relationship was not analyzed; however, a large number of 
"never" and "seldom" responses to such practices as turning of geolocalization when 
not used, modiication of default settings ater installation, or veriication of the author 
and source before uploading may indicate that the respondents do not see the risks 
associated with the violation of institutional privacy. 
he analysis of the correlation between participation or non-participation in class-
es or workshops on internet safety and privacy (ISP), and the level of intensiication 
of online institutional privacy protection practices (IPPP), has brought interesting 
results. Statistically signiicant diferences in the level of the IPPP were observed 
only in relation to the group of respondents participating in classes/workshops on 
ISP. hey concerned such practices as: veriication of the source and author of the 
application before downloading, checking what kind of access on a mobile device is 
requested for the installed application, disabling geolocation on a mobile device or 
social networking site when not using the navigation or a map function, modifying 
the supplied privacy settings on a mobile device, or checking the permissions the 
new page requests when the respondents log in using a social media account. Inter-
estingly, in the case of such strategies as installing plug-ins for search engines that 
protect against tracking and private data collectors, using a mailbox that encrypts data, 
deleting cookies or using various search engines to protect digital identity, a similar 
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level of intensiication was observed in both groups. Perhaps the diferences arise from 
the fact that certain privacy practices are more engaging and require more specialist 
knowledge (e.g. installing plug-ins in search engines against tracking and private data 
collectors or using a mailbox that encrypts data) and habitual repetition, which can 
be deined as habitual privacy protection strategies (e.g. deleting cookies or using 
various search engines).
Interpreting the diferences described above on online institutional privacy prac-
tices, it is worth referring to the concept of the types of privacy expressed by Katie 
Raynes-Goldie (2010). It distinguishes social privacy – when a user wants to protect 
their personal data against the misuse by other users, and institutional privacy – when 
a user wants to protect themself against data collection by companies and institutions. 
Each of these types requires diferent practices (Matzner et al. 2016). Institutional 
privacy protection involves the use of more advanced tools, which requires greater 
technical competence related to, for example, changing the application settings or 
installing an appropriate program. It also requires more active practices that "serve 
to build a protected sphere" (Matzner et al. 2016, p. 282). 
 he result of the study can be used to develop activity programs devoted to online 
privacy in the context of surveillance capitalism. hey also show that although the 
majority of respondents had moderate knowledge and attitudes about surveillance 
capitalism, which may result from insuicient knowledge of the subject matter, the 
participation in specialized activities/workshops can inluence the level of intensii-
cation of online privacy protection strategies. However, the conclusions presented in 
the article contain some limitations. he study did not verify what kind of speciic 
contents were implemented within the framework of the classes and workshops on 
internet safety and privacy (ISP) in which the respondents declared participation. 
A detailed analysis of the issues carried out during classes and workshops could 
additionally show how efective those educational impacts were and what factors 
inluenced the respondents.
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